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COMMENTS
it, parol evidence is admissible to locate the property. With re-
spect to intervening rights of third parties, the problem is
whether the description in the recorded act of sale sufficiently
identifies the property to put third parties on notice of prior
transactions involving the property. The identifying descrip-
tion required for this purpose must often be more specific than
that required between the parties. The attributes of a written
description which identifies the property sufficiently to meet
each of these situations cannot be conclusively stated; the situa-
tion has apparently not changed since 1872 when the Supreme
Court said: "We are not prepared to fix the line between valid
and invalid or sufficient and insufficient descriptions, which
shall serve as a guide in all future cases. Each case must depend
on its own circumstances. '4
Leila 0. Cutshaw
ROYALTY DIVISION ORDERS
INTRODUCTION'
Complex division in the ownership of petroleum production
is the rule rather than the exception. The speculative value of
undeveloped minerals; the prevalence of the oil and gas lease,
with its provision for the lessor's royalty, as the means by which
the developer acquires his interest; the use of the overriding
royalty and the production payment as vehicles for profit in
lease brokerage and as means of obtaining financing for devel-
opment; all contribute to the difficult problem of apportioning
the revenue from mineral production in the petroleum industry. 2
The instruments by which various parties have acquired their
respective interests in the production should, of course, govern
the apportionment of the revenues of production. But the un-
48. Consolidated Ass'n of Planters v. Mason, 24 La. Ann. 518, 520 (1872).
1. For purposes of this paper any party entitled to a share in production
revenues is considered a royalty owner. "Seller" and "purchaser," unless other-
wise indicated, refer to the royalty owner as seller and the pipeline owner as
purchaser under the royalty division order. "Lessor" will be substituted for
"seller" when referring to royalty payment rights under a lease.
2. E.g., divided ownership may result from a lessor's 1/8 lease royalty (Cheek
v. Metzer, 116 Tex. 356, 291 S.W. 860 (1927)), subsequent conveyances (Texas
Co. v. Leach, 219 La. 613, 53 So. 2d 786 (1951)), or unitization (Dobbins v.
Hodges, 208 La. 143, 23 So. 2d 26 (1945) ; Robinson v. Horton, 197 La. 919, 2
So. 2d 647 (1941)). One oil property in the Oklahoma City Field is reportedly
shared by 750 royalty owners. GLASSMIRE, OIL AND GAS LEASES AND ROYALTIES
312, § 83 (2d ed. 1938).
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certainties created by these instruments frequently discourage
prospective purchasers of production. To remove these uncer-
tainties and facilitate sale of production, the industry has de-
veloped a specialized contract for sale of production designed to
afford protection to the purchaser by apportioning the price
among the sellers, normally3 in proportion with their respective
interests in the minerals produced. This agreement, known as
a royalty division order, is a contract to sell all production de-
livered to a transporting pipe line, stipulating to whom and in
what proportions the purchase price is to be paid. 4 The royalty
owner's freedom to contract for sale of produced oil may be lim-
ited either by the contract under which he holds or by industry
conventions. For example, a mineral lessee's agency powers5 or
a working-interest owner's powers may permit the operator to
negotiate initially for all royalty owners in creating a purchase
agreement with a pipe line owner as purchaser. After negotia-
tions for the sale of the oil and a title examination, the pur-
chaser normally requires execution of a royalty division order
to assure proper distribution of royalty proceeds and to protect
himself from multiplicity of claims. Although division orders
are extensively utilized in Louisiana, there is little jurisprudence
on the effects of Louisiana contract and sales law on them; these
effects will be the subject of this Comment.
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Common law jurisdictions consider the division order a con-
3. In certain situations the proportion of the proceeds due may not be equiva-
lent to the mineral ownership, as in the case where heirs of deceased grant sur-
viving spouse with usufruct of property the right to the proceeds through the
division order.
4. Wagner v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 182 Kan. 81, 318 P.2d 1039
(1957) ; Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Terrell, 183 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.
1944).
5. Leases usually provide for the lessee to deliver the royalty oil to the pur-
chaser's pipeline and receive payments as agent for the lessor. Tremont Lumber
Co. v. Louisiana Oil Ref. Corp., 187 La. 454, 175 So. 25 (1937). Even though
the lease may not authorize the lessee to sell the lessor's royalty oil to a purchaser,
if the lessor provides no storage facilities, the lessee is impliedly authorized to
sell as agent. Wolfe v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 83 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1936) ;
Wolfe v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1936) ; Sohio Petroleum Co. v. United
States & P. R.R., 222 La. 383, 62 So. 2d 615 (1953). These provisions are found
in the royalty clause of the lease. In addition to duties pertaining to delivery of
the lessor's oil in kind, the royalty clause contains a provision that requires the
lessee to account to the lessor for payment of the latter's 1/8 royalty. This pro-
vision forms the basis of substantial portions of subsequent discussion.
6. In the case of royalty carved out of the working interest, the working in-
terest owner, as result either of contract provision or industry convention, has
power to act as agent in selling production until a purchasing agreement is per-
fected between the purchaser and the individual royalty owners.
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tract to sell production runs.7 Each owner of an interest
entitled to a portion of production agrees to sell his desig-
nated portion of production, warranting the title thereto, in re-
turn for a stipulated price or consideration determined by the
prevailing market price. Significantly, the division order is not
a sale of accrued or unaccrued royalty,8 but rather a contract to
sell oil as produced and delivered to purchaser's pipeline; the
sale is complete only upon delivery. The contract is usually held
terminable at the will of either party unless the contrary is stip-
ulated.9
The elements of the royalty division order requiring most in-
tensive examination are: (a) provision that any dispute con-
cerning the seller's title to the minerals authorizes the purchaser
to withhold payment without interest until title is determined,
unless the seller furnishes a satisfactory indemnity bond; (b)
provision that the purchaser is not bound by any transfer of
interest or change of ownership until he receives a transfer
order and recorded instrument evidencing such transfer; (c)
warranty by each seller that he is the legal owner of the pro-
portion of production set forth opposite his name; (d) authori-
zation of the purchaser to take all production, crediting each
seller in proportion to the amount opposite his name.10
WITHHOLDING PAYMENTS
Common law jurisdictions uphold judicially the provision
permitting a purchaser to withhold payments without interest
if any dispute regarding the seller's title to the royalty arises."
7. Wagner v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 182 Kan. 81, 318 P.2d 1039(1957) ; Simpson v. United States Pipe Line Co., 196 Miss. 356, 17 So. 2d 200
(1944).
8. Williams Adm'r v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 283 Ky. 644, 143 S.W.2d 297(1940) ; Thompson v. Thompson, 149 Tex. 632, 236 S.W.2d 779 (1951) ; Hogg
v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 267 S.W. 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). See 8 OIL &
GAS REP. 377 (1957), 7 OIL & GAs REP. 41 (1956). But cf. Robbins v. Martin,
18 La. App. 223, 138 So. 132 (2d Cir. 1931) (division orders estopped seller from
questioning prior partial conveyance).
9. Snider v. Snider, 208 Okla. 231, 255 P.2d 273 (1953) ; Marlarnee v. Pauline
Oil & Gas Co., 133 Okla. 192, 271 Pac. 937 (1928) ; Welch v. Pauline Oil & Gas
Co., 133 Okla. 122, 271 Pac. 651 (1928).
10. 3 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS 137 (1957). Several other pertinent provi-
sions excluded from this Comment, are: (e) provision for termination of the order
on written notice by the seller (or, occasionally, by either party) ; (f) require-
ment that the seller notify the purchaser of suits affecting title to the minerals
and indemnify the latter against all costs incurred defending such suits; (g)
provision that production is to become the property of the purchaser on delivery.
11. Wolfe v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 83 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1936) ; Wolfe v.
Texas Co., 83 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1936).
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However, literal enforcement of the provision grants unfair ad-
vantage to unscrupulous third party claimants; since even a
frivolous extra-judicial claim of title authorizes withholding roy-
alty payments, the beleaguered royalty owner may be forced to
accept an unjust settlement to escape harassment.12
Louisiana has apparently legislated with this possibility in
mind. Revised Statutes 30:105-10713 make unlawful withhold-
ing of required royalty payments to royalty owners unless a
suit testing title to the interest has been filed, and provides for
mandamus to compel payment of "rentals, royalties, or other
sums due."'14 These statutes virtually eliminate the withholding
provision as an instrument of third-party harassment, since a
title claimant will rarely undertake the trouble and expense of
litigation unless he has some reasonable basis for his claim.15
TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP
Public Records Doctrine
Revised Statutes 30:106 further provides that the oil pur-
chaser is "fully protected" by making payments under the di-
vision order to the last record owner. 1 There seems little doubt
12. GLASSmnm, OIL AND GAS LEASES AND ROYALTIES 223, § 60 (2d ed. 1938).
13. LA. R.S. 30:105-107 (1950). See discussion in text accompanying notes
16-19 infra.
14. The right to such extraordinary relief has, however, been judicially limited.
The Supreme Court has required that the "sums due" must be definite, fixed, and
certain -liquidated or capable of liquidation by simple mathematical calculation.
State ex rel. Superior Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 242 La. 315, 136
So. 2d 55 (1962); State ex rel. Brown v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 197 La.
616, 2 So. 2d 41 (1941) ; State ex rel. Boykin v. Elope Producing Co., 167 So.
506 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936). The Superior case held that mandamus was not
available where there was no contract between claimant and defendant, because
the requirement of definite price was not met. The court did not deny a remedy
existed, but merely held that mandamus under LA. R.S. 30:107 (1950) was not
the proper one. In Brown and Boykin it was held that mandamus was not the
appropriate remedy where the lessor alleged royalties due in excess of those stip-
ulated in the lease. See generally Comment, 4 LA. L. REV. 304 (1942) ; see Irion
v. Standard Oil Co., 199 La. 363, 6 So. 2d 143 (1942).
15. This legislation seems part of a well-integrated system for protection of
both royalty owner and oil purchaser in the event of title disputes. The seller is
protected against economic pressure associated with unmeritorious claims to roy-
alties. Concomitantly, the purchaser is protected in that he may withhold pay-
ments after suit has been filed.
16. LA. R.S. 30:106 (1950) : "A' person producing minerals under a lease
granted by the last record owner and holding under an instrument sufficient in-
terms to transfer title to the land or mineral rights, shall be presumed to have
derived his record from the true owner. A purchaser of minerals produced from
a recorded lease . . . shall be fully protected in making payment to any party in
interest under the lease unless and until . . . suit [between owner and claimant].
should be filed and the purchaser receives notification of it by the usual postal
registry receipt card. The purchaser shall not be entitled to this protection unless
[Vol. XXIII:
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that the legislature, through enactment of this provision, intend-
ed to extend the protection afforded by the public records doc-
trine to transfers of royalty division orders. 1 7 The extension
seems justified because the division order, though a contract to
sell movables, is closely related to immovables; protecting the
division order supplements the protection afforded immovables 19
and lends stability to the titles of record owners of immovable
property and to oil and gas industry marketing practices.
Transfer-of-Ownership Clause
The transfer-of-ownership clause provides that the purchaser
under a division order is not bound by transfer of interest or
change of ownership until a transfer order and recorded instru-
ment evidencing the transfer are received ;20 it complements the
withholding provision. Since the withholding provision does not
protect the oil purchaser against a transferee of the record own-
er who records the conveyance but does not give notice, the
transfer-of-ownership clause is necessary. 21 The royalty owner's
transferee takes subject to recorded restrictions, one of which
is the division order, and thus it seems he cannot claim royalty
payments until the proper notice is given. 22
he has recorded in the conveyance records of the parish in which the land is
located, notice that the minerals have been and will be bought by him."
17. State ex rel. Brown v. United Gas Public Service Co., 197 La. 616, 2 So.2d
41 (1941) ; State ez rel. Bean v. Caddo Oil Purchasing Corp., 189 So. 333 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1939) ; State ex rel. Muslow v. Louisiana Oil Ref. Corp., 176 So.
686 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937). Bean held that § 106 was passed in the interests
of royalty owners, lessees and the purchasers of oil, and that upon filing of the
requisite purchasing notice the purchaser would be protected against non-record
ownership claimants for all proceeds paid to the record owner.
18. Division orders are the consequences of divided ownership of production,
which in turn is the resultant of mineral servitudes, royalty sales, and leases-
in this context immovable transactions. Mineral servitudes and mineral royalty
are held real rights, thus subject to the rules applicable to immovable things, in-
cluding the protection afforded by recordation. Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1,
187 So. 35 (1939); Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756,
91 So. 207 (1922). LA. R.S. 9:2721 (1950) has spelled out the public records
doctrine protection applicable to mineral leases.
19. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 9:2721, 2722, 1105, 4811, 5101, 5102 (1950).
20. Such provisions usually delay the effectiveness of a royalty transfer until
notice of it is received by the purchaser. Standard Oil Co. v. Craig, 202 Ark. 168,
150 S.W.2d 744 (1941) ; Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Melton, 139 Okla. 119, 281
Pac. 591 (1929) ; Tide Water Associated Oil Co. v. Hammer, 163 S.W.2d 232
(Tex. Civ. App. 1942) ; Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Wood, 129 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939). However, if the purchaser does not heed the notice of change of
ownership, no subsequent protection is afforded by the provision. Shell Petroleum
Corp. v. Royal Petroleum Corp., 135 Tex. 12, 137 S.W.2d 753 (1940) ; McLean
v. Texas Co., 103 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1939).
21. LA. R.S. 30:105-107 (1950) require payment to the last record owner.
* 22. It is arguable that such transferee becomes a record owner and is thereby
entitled to claim royalty from the oil purchaser who, under LA. R.S. 30:105-107
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WARRANTY
Under the warranty clause 23 each seller warrants title to his
stipulated share of production runs. The function of this clause
is evident; the purchaser of oil and gas from a person not en-
titled to them may be subject to damages for unlawful taking.24
Under the sales articles of the Louisiana Civil Code, a seller
warrants the purchaser's peaceable possession of the thing sold,
unless the contrary is stipulated.2 5 If the buyer is then evicted,
the seller is liable to restore the price, return the fruits and
revenues returned to the evictor by the buyer, and pay all costs
occasioned by the suit. Additionally, "damages . . . besides the
price . . . paid" are recoverable.2 6 Upon suit against the pur-
chaser by a third person, the purchaser may "bring in any per-
son ... who is his warrantor" as a party to the action.2 T Deliv-
ery of production pursuant to the division order results in a sale
governed by these sales provisions. Therefore, a purchaser at-
tacked by a third person claiming ownership of his share of pro-
duction runs should be entitled to call his vendor in warranty to
defend the action.2 8
Co-SIGNERS' RELATIONSHIP
In common law jurisdictions each co-signer of a royalty di-
vision order contracts to sell, and warrantys title to, only his own
(1950), is only protected when making payment to the last record owner. If
this position should prevail, the transfer-of-ownership clause might assume the
character of an indemnity agreement permitting the oil purchaser to require in-
demnification of the transferor.
If the change of title were not recorded but notice of title transfer were for-
warded to the purchaser and the purchaser continues to pay the last record owner,
there should be no charge of wrongful taking since the statutory provisions of
payment to the last record owner have been met. However, the oil purchaser has
breached the contract in failing to pay royalty to the vendee, for which damages
should lie. However, such situations seem unlikely as a vendee of producing oil
property is not apt to fail to give notice of his acquisition to the purchaser or
to record his title.
23. The warranty clause is also referred to as the "their respective interest"
clause. See note 32 infra.
24. Hughes v. United Pipe Lines, 119 N.Y. 423, 23 N.E. 1042 (1890).
25. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2475, 2476, 2500 (1870).
26. Id. art 2506.
27. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1111 (1960).
28. Though this remedy is available, its value may be curtailed by insolvency
of the alleged royalty owners. This sometimes inadequate protection, the desire
to do away with frivolous claims, and the important policy behind creation of
stable market conditions for the Louisiana petroleum industry seem to have been
instrumental in the high degree of protection given by LA. R.S. 30:106 (1950)
to the purchaser who pays the last record owner. Though this warranty may
provide little practical protection, reliance on the public records substantially
protects the purchaser.
576
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stipulated share of production runs.29  No legal relationship is
created between co-signers.3Q Under the first principle, no co-
signer is responsible for a failure of another co-signer's title.
Under the second, a co-signer is not precluded by signing an in-
accurately apportioned division order from recovering against
another co-signer unjustly enriched.
Both principles are probably valid in Louisiana. Dictum in
Ferrell v. Simms3' suggests Louisiana will view the contract as
creating legal relationships only between each seller and the,
purchaser. In any event, the division order apparently negates
the idea of solidary warranty as it provides that the parties war-
rant title only to "their respective interests. ' 32 The absence of
contractual ties between co-signers should eliminate any pre-
clusion that would hinder one co-signer's seeking restitution
from another.
INACCURATE APPORTIONMENT
General Provisions
Occasionally, a division order will erroneously allocate to a
seller a smaller proportion of production payments than his pro-
portionate ownership of production runs, allocating the excess
to another seller.3 3 The injured seller might seek redress against
29. Dale v. Case, 217 Miss. 298, 64 So. 2d 344 (1953) ; Blafeman v. Gem Oil
Co., 163 Neb. 438, 80 N.W.2d 139 (1956) ; Chicago Corp. v. Wall, 156 Tex. 217,
293 S.W.2d 844 (1956); Allen v. Creighton, 131 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939).
30. Wagner v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 182 Kan. 81, 318 P.2d 1039
(1957) ; Simpson v. United States Pipe Line Co., 196 Miss. 356, 17 So. 2d 200
(1944).
31. 209 La. 1072, 26 So. 2d 143 (1946). In attempting to invalidate a division
order, plaintiff-seller contended that Ferguson, a co-signer, had not received the
proportion due him under the order. After determining Ferguson had received
the correct proportion, the court concluded that in any event the division of Fer-
guson's royalty interest did not affect the other landowners' rights.
32. Some lawyers preparing division orders strike or leave out the "their
respective interests" portion of the warranty clause apparently with the intention
of requiring each signer to warrant title to all production -not just to his stipu-
lated interest. Neither Louisiana nor the common law jurisdictions have deter-
mined the effect of this deletion. However, in an analogous situation it has been
suggested that the warranty would be binding where the owner of an undivided
interest in fee executes a lease in which the lessee requires him to warrant title
to all of the fee. WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAs LAW 573, § 503.3 (1959). Though it
seems unlikely that a lessor would knowingly enter such an agreement, principles
of freedom to contract seem to permit it. However, as warranting a more ex-
tensive title than that conveyed is unusual, it should be suspect, particularly so
where the warranty results from a mere deletion or omission. Consequently, it is
suggested that the attempted enlargement of the warranty protection should be
effective only if the division order unequivocally states that each party is to war-.
rant title to all mineral produced.
33. The discussion is limited to those inaccurate apportionments producing
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the purchaser; against the lessee for breach of the obligation to
pay under the royalty clause of the lease; or against the party
receiving the overpayment under the inaccurately apportioned
division order on a theory of unjust enrichment.
Common Law.- In common law jurisdictions a seller who
signs an inaccurately apportioned division order is held estopped
to claim the excess against the purchaser.3 4 Further, a royalty
owner, by signing the division order as seller, relieves his lessee
of the duty to pay royalty under the lease, and accepts instead
the obligation of the purchaser to pay under the terms of the
division order.3 5 However, the injured seller may recover from
an unjustly enriched recipient the increment of production pay-
ments to which the injured seller was entitled.3 6
Louisiana. - Though the jurisprudence and legislation are in-
sufficient to reach definitive conclusions, it seems Louisiana will
follow these common law rules. Brown v. Sugar Creek Syndi-
cate37 apparently determined that estoppel by contract would be
applicable to cases of inaccurate apportionment. By signing the
division order the seller was held estopped to contest the ac-
curacy of the apportionment in an action against the pur-
deficiencies in one royalty owner's proportionate ownership and a corresponding
excess in another's -errors in curative and title work and certain types of cler-
ical errors, e.g., transposition. The type of clerical error normally complained of,
though, results in a deficiency without corresponding excess, such that in effect
the purchaser is the party unjustly enriched in not having disbursed one hundred
per cent of the proceeds. It would seem the unjustly enriched purchaser would
readily reform the contract according to the correct apportionment. Randazzo v.
Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, 196 La. 822, 200 So. 267 (1941); Giovanovich v.
Breda's Heirs, 149 La. 402, 89 So. 251 (1921). For general survey of reforma-
tion of instruments in Louisiana, including reformation for clerical errors, see
Comment, 30 TUL. L. Rev. 486 (1956).
34. Dale v. Case, 217 Miss. 298, 64 So. 2d 344 (1953) ; Chicago Corp. v. Wall,
156 Tex. 217, 293 S.W.2d 844 (1956). Estoppel by contract prevents the party
asserting a fact in the document from taking a position inconsistent therewith
and detrimental to the other party. BIoaLOW, EsToPPEL 495 (6th ed. 1913). It
should -be noted that the seller may terminate the agreement at any time, and
thus assert a claim to his proper share thereafter. See note 10 supra.
35. Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Melton, 139 Okla. 119, 281 Pac. 591 (1929)
Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Liberty Pipe Line Co., 71 S.W.2d 393 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1934) ; Texas Co. v. Beall, 3 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) ; 4
WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 705 (1962). But see Indian Territory Illuminat-
ing Oil Co. v. Killingsworth, 175 Okla. 78, 51 P.2d 505 (1935). This effect on
the royalty clause appears to be an exception rather than the rule, as most lease
provisions are unaffected by a royalty division order. 4 WILLIAMS, id. § 706. E.g.,
Louisiana Live Stock & Planting Co. v. Kendall, 155 La. 122, 98 So. 862 (1923)
(express drilling covenant).
36. Dale v. Case, 217 Miss. 298, 64 So. 2d 344 (1953) ; Hafeman v. Gem Oil
Co., 163 Neb. 438, 80 N.W.2d 139 (1956) ; Chicago Corp. v. Wall, 156 Tex. 217,
293 S.W.2d 844 (1956) ; Allen v. Creighton, 131 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939).
37. 195 La. 865, 197 So. 583 (1940).
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chaser.3 8 Recovery against the lessee also seems precluded in
Louisiana, as in common law jurisdictions. Though no cases
were found directly on point, it seems clear that a division order
accomplishes a substitution of debtors, thus effecting a nova-
tion of that part of the lease providing for payment of royal-
ties. Though a novation is not to be presumed 39 it may be ef-
fected by acts of a creditor that clearly evidence an intent to
look no longer to the original debtor for payment.40 Contractual
substitution of one debtor for another - purchaser for lessee -
seems adequate to show a clear intent no longer to look to the
original debtor for payment.41 Finally, recovery for unjust en-
richment is available under Article 2301 of the Civil Code. 42
Lessee-Purchaser
General Provisions. - When a lessee is also the purchaser it
may be necessary to distinguish his rights and duties in each
capacity.43 Suppose a lessee is obligated to pay 1/16 of produc-
38. The court's authority for its position came from decisions declaring that
parties to an agreement are bound by the terms thereof. E.g., Mims v. Sample,
191 La. 677, 186 So. 66 (1939) ; Sam George Fur Co. v. Arkansas-Louisiana
Pipeline Co., 177 La. 284, 148 So. 51 (1933) ; Robbins v. Martin, 18 La. App.
223, 138 So. 132 (1931). Though none of the decisions dealt with royalty di-
vision orders the concept of contract estoppel seems equally applicable to all valid
written contracts. As the agreement is terminable at the will of either party (see
note 10 8supra) the seller may effectively prevent a recurrence of inadequate pay-
ments by terminating the old and requiring a new agreement.
39. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2190, 2192 (1870) ; White Co. v. Hammond Stage
Lines, 180 La. 962, 158 So. 353 (1934).
40. Strunk Chain Saws, Inc. v. Williams, 111 So. 2d 195 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1959) involved a substitution of debtors that the defendant contended worked a
novation. In reply to the plaintiff's contention that novations are not to be pre-
sumed the court stated: "[O]ur courts have not adhered to the strict construction
contended for ...but have ruled a release or discharge can be evidenced by acts
of a creditor clearly disclosing an intent to no longer look to the original debtor
for payment." Id. at 197.
41. It may be argued that rather than a substitution of debtors the division
order effects a change in the lessee's liability from primary to secondary. How-
ever, as uniformity in the area of mineral law between Louisiana and her sur-
rounding common law states appears desirable, where conceptually permissive, an
interpretation which would produce such uniformity should be favored.
42. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2301 (1870). Cf. id. arts. 1965, 2292-2294. Article
2301 serves as foundation for any action to recover for unjust enrichment by pro-
viding that "he who receives what is not due to him, whether he receives it through
error or knowingly, obliges himself to restore it to him from whom he has unduly
received it." Application of this statute should allow recovery by the injured
seller against the enriched seller for breach of a quasi-contractual obligation. See
LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2311, 1934 (1870). See also Greenfield Box Co. v. Inde-
pendence Veneer & Box Mfg. Co., 163 La. 86, 111 So. 608 (1927) ; Standard Oil
Co. v. Sugar Products Co., 160 La. 763, 107 So. 566 (1926) ; Crammer v. Fidelity
& Cas. Co., 18 So. 2d 220 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944).
43. E.g., Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Terrell, 183 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.
1944) (where lessee was also purchaser, provisions of division order limiting
lessor's rights as provided in lease did not prevail; lessor entitled to royalty pay-
ments without tax deductions as per lease).
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tion to lessor A and 1/16 to lessor B under the royalty clauses
of separate leases, but the lessee is also purchaser under a signed
division order allocating 1/32 of the proceeds of sale to A and
3/32 to B.
Common law courts have not differentiated between lessee-
purchasers and third-party purchasers; the lessee is relieved of
the royalty obligation in both situations.44 Additionally, in his
capacity as purchaser the lessee is protected by contract estoppel.
No court appears to have considered the possibility that a lessee
who prepares an erroneously apportioned division order should,
on the basis of equitable estoppel, be held to his duty to pay
under the lease, or, should, in his capacity as purchaser, equi-
tably be denied the protection of contract estoppel. It seems,
however, that in any case the doctrine of equitable estoppel is
not applicable to the lessee-purchaser situation.45 While nova-
tion seems clearly appropriate to relieve a Louisiana lessee from
his royalty obligation in the third-party purchaser situation,46 a
strong argument can be made that a lessee-purchaser should not
be similarly relieved.
For ease of reference in this section the lessee-purchaser will be called the
lessee, and in the lessor-seller will be called the lessor.
44. Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Melton, 139 Okla. 119, 281 Pac. 591 (1929).
However, if the lessee is the party enriched, he is protected neither by the substi-
tution of debtors nor the doctrine of estoppel. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Terrell,
183 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). See also 7 OIL & GAS REP. 69, 71
(1957), 1 OIL & GAS REP. 1175 (1952). It should be remembered that since
the order is revocable the lessor may reimpose an obligation upon the lessee in
this respect by revoking the order.
45. If the lessee has misled the lessor to the latter's detriment, the lessee may
be estopped to deny his duty to pay under the lease. However, for equitable estop-
pel to be successfully asserted there must exist either false representation or con-
cealment of material facts, made with actual or constructive knowledge of the
facts; the party to whom it was made must have been without knowledge of, or
the means of knowing, the real facts; it must have been made with the intention
that it be acted upon; and, the party to whom it was made must have relied or
acted upon it to his prejudice. BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL C. XVIII, § 1 (6th ed. 1913) ;
31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 122 (1942). For the Louisiana position on estoppel by con-
duct see Little v. Barbe, 195 La. 1071, 198 So. 368 (1940) ; Parker v. Ohio Oil
Co., 191 La. 896, 186 So. 604 (1939) ; Succession of Valdes, 44 So. 2d 151 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1950) ; Jones v. Alford, 172 So. 213 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937). See
generally Note, 15 LA. L. REV. 855 (1955). Normally the lessor could not suc-
cessfully contend he had no knowledge of the facts as he had in his possession both
the division order and the lease and could easily have compared the royalty frac-
tions apportioned to him by each. Furthermore, the lessee-purchaser generally
has not intentionally misrepresented the facts as this apparently requires a state
of mind akin to fraud. BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL 648 (6th ed. 1913). Finally, no estop-
pel arises where the representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped
results from ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake, usually the case in a
division order dispute. 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 128 (1942). Thus in the normal
situation the requisites of equitable estoppel will not be present.
46. See text at note 39 supra.
COMMENTS
Mistake in the Principal Cause. - As previously indicated, a
lessee's duty to pay lease royalty in Louisiana is displaced, on
the principle of novation, by the payment provisions of the di-
vision order.4 7 Termination of the division order, which can be
accomplished unilaterally, revives the lease royalty obligation.4
Nullity of the division order should retroactively reinstate the
lessee's obligation to pay royalty under the lease. 49 It is sub-
mitted that an inaccurately apportioned division order is null for
mistake in the principal cause in the lessee-purchaser situation,
though not in the third-party purchaser situation.
Mistake concerning the principal cause for contracting is a
vice of consent permitting invalidation of the agreement by the
party suffering under the vice,50 if "the other party was ap-
prised that it was the principal cause of the agreement, or unless
from the nature of the transaction it must be presumed that he
knew it."'51 The seller's principal cause in contracting a sale is
receipt of the price. Obviously a lessor signing a division order
intends to receive the price of his full share of production as
provided by the lease. This is his principal cause.52 Therefore
the critical issue is whether the lessee-purchaser who signs a
division order as purchaser should be held to know that the
lessor's principal cause for signing the division order is to re-
ceive the undelivered price of the lease.
47. See text at note 40 supra.
48. The principle of contractual estoppel, said previously to prevent the lessor's
contesting the agreement with the purchaser, requires that the agreement be a
valid contract; if invalid, there can be no estoppel based on its terms. BIGELOw,
ESTOPPEL 495 (6th ed. 1913). However, it does not seem that invalidation of the
division order will expose the purchaser to liability for conversion. As the lessee's
duties under the royalty clause are in a sense reactivated, so too are his agency
powers. Thus, the lessee may sell oil to the purchaser for the lessor. The pur-
chasing executed during the supposed existence of the division order may be valid
under the agency powers, so that no conversion by the purchaser would result.
49. See first paragraph note 55 infra. This seems true unless it could be
proved that the lessor intended receipt of the smaller amount under the division
order to satisfy fully the existing debt under the lease, thus effecting a remission.
Acceptance by the lessor of less than the full obligation due him may relieve the
lessee of his full obligation, as a creditor may accept less than full payment as
settlement for a debt. Jones v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 213 La. 1051, 36 So. 2d
34 (1948). However, remission of a debt is not presumed but must be expressed.
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2199 (1870) ; C. 0. Black Inc. v. Swink, 197 So. 693 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1940). Thus, mistakenly accepting the smaller royalty will not satis-
fy the debt unless such is the lessor's intention. Jones v. Southern Natural Gas
Co., supra.
50. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1819, 1823-1826 (1870).
51. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1826 (1870).
52. It is frequently held that a mineral lessor's object in leasing, the considera-
tion, is to receive the payments due under the lease. Davis v. Laster, 242 La.
735, 138 So. 2d 558 (1962) ; Melancon v. Texas Co., 230 La. 593, 89 So. 2d 135
(1956) ; Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 173 La. 313, 137 So. 46 (1931) ; Saunders
v. Busch-Everett Co., 138 La. 1049, 71 So. 153 (1914).
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Pretermitting the issue of actual knowledge, it surely can
be said of the lessee-purchaser that "from the nature of the
transaction it must be presumed that he knew of it." '5 a As lessee
he knows the lessor's price for leasing includes the lease royalty.
When he assumes the role of purchaser, he should still be held
to have his lessee's knowledge that the full lease price is unde-
livered.54 Should the lessee-purchaser be held apprised of the
lessor-seller's principal cause, the remedy for this error in prin-
cipal cause is rescission based upon the nullity of the division
order. Lessee's fulfillment of the payment obligation under the
lease should be required as though the division had never af-
fected it.-- Consequently, recovery for any loss previously sus-
tained due to inaccurate apportionment should be available
against the lessee.
53. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1826 (1870).
54. This area may be further complicated by the problem of imputed cor-
porate knowledge.
55. Pretermitting questions of equities of third persons relying on the division
order, nullifying the division order necessarily nullifies all the sales thereunder,
as between seller and purchaser, resulting in the purchaser having bought the oil
without authority. On the theory that the lessee's duty to pay royalty is relieved
by the purchaser's under the division order, nullifying the division order should
nullify this substitution, particularly since the lessee cannot be considered a third
party relying on the conduct and contracts of another. Consequently, the nulli-
fication, in effect, results in the lessee having sold the production runs to the
purchaser but not having paid the proper price therefor. Under such situations,
the lessee/purchaser's defenses of substitution of debtors and contract estoppel
should be denied and liability imposed for the improper payment.
It should be noted that the above discussion concerning the effect of an error
in recited apportionment presupposes that the recitation of each signer's interest
in the division order represents the price of the contract- that the consideration
for making the agreement is to receive, e.g., 5% of the total sale price of all the
oil produced by the well with this percentage represented by the interest figure
found opposite each owner's name. An alternative presupposition is possible, but
it presents novel problems. It is possible that the agreement simply declares that
each signer grants the purchaser the right to take 5% of the oil from the area
covered by the division order. This approach supposes that the "interest" repre-
sents title, i.e., it is merely a descriptive designation, rather than a price. Such
a result would require extensive application of Louisana property law rather than
obligations law, with potential problems beyond the scope of this paper. To il-
lustrate, however, one problem will be considered. Suppose the signer owns 7%
royalty interest in a well, but signs a division order reciting only 5% interest
opposite his name? le would contend that he in no way indicated that he
owns only 5% interest, but rather he owns another 2% which the purchaser
has been converting. Is this analogous to the situation which an owner of
7 acres of land sells 5, and the purchaser claims all 7? It is submitted that it
is not and that such problems do not arise, as the interest recitation is in fact
a stip~ulation of the entire price owed the seller by the purchaser. The division
orders of the Tennessee Gas Transmission Company, which appear representative
of the petroleum industry, state the purchaser is "hereby authorized to receive
and sell all oil produced from the above described property and to give credit
for, in the proceeds, as directed below." (Emphasis added.) In effect the seller
declares that the purchaser is authorized to purchase all the oil taken from the
well and delivered to him, and in consideration he must pay the seller a fraction
of the total sale value of the oil. As this fraction is the total price requested by
COMMENTS
It may be argued that cancellation for mistake in the prin-
cipal cause is applicable to third party purchasers as well, on
the following theory: during the title examination that precedes
circulation of a division order the purchaser necessarily discov-
ers the lease in question and is thereby constructively apprised
that the lessor's principal cause for signing the division order is
to receive the undelivered lease price. However, the writer feels
it is better policy to limit cancellation for mistake in principal
cause to the lessee-purchaser situation. As constructive notice
depends on the "nature of the transaction," a meaningful dis-
tinction between the two purchaser situations is realized from
their differing factual settings. It seems, therefore, that where
the purchaser's only knowledge of the lease royalty comes from
a lease discovered in a title search he should not be held to know
of an error in the principal cause as he should be where he has
also promised to pay the lease royalty.
Termination of the Lease. - It has been held that "failure
to pay production royalties under an oil and gas lease, for any
appreciable length of time, without justification, amounts to
an active breach of such lease which entitles the lessor to can-
cellation thereof without necessity of placing the lessee in formal
default." '56 Thus if a division order is annulled for mistake in
the principal cause, the lessee would be chargeable with failure
to pay full production royalties due under the lease during the
order's duration and possibly subjected to cancellation. How-
ever, the court in Jones v. Southern Natural Gas Co. 5 7 held that
failure to properly pay delay rentals, which was a consequence
of an innocent mistake in accounting, amounted to "justifica-
tion" and cancellation was refused. In light of the trend in re-
cent jurisprudence apparently glossing over the distinctions be-
tween delay rentals and production royalty, drawing upon this
merely analogous principle seems legally permissive and con-
sistent.5 8 It is suggested, therefore, that although an innocent
the seller, the principle of contractual estoppel is applicable to prevent a demand
for a larger price. It seems clear then that the interest recitation is a designa-
tion of price rather than a description of property.
56. Bailey v. Meadows, 130 So. 2d 501, 508 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961). Recently
another appeal court reaffirmed the rule by permitting cancellation without
putting in default for a failure to pay production royalties for seven months
without justification. Pierce v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 140 So. 2d 19 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1962).
57. 213 La. 1051, 36 So. 2d 34 (1948) (assignee of lease paid lessor inadequate
delay rentals due to mistake regarding total number of acres assigned; lessor's
cancellation denied; held, payments delayed through accident or mistake do not
justify cancellation).
58. Though there has historically been variant legal effect in decisions deal-
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mistake in a division order may result in its nullity, the lease
on the property which it covers should not be subject to termina-
tion for nonpayment of royalty while the division order was
in force.
Non-Lessor Royalty Owner
A non-lessor royalty owner is not entitled to the benefit of
the covenants in the lease concerning payment of royalty unless
he is a party to the agreement or is made a third party benefi-
ciary.59 Thus the royalty owner has no basis for asserting liabil-
ity of the lessee. The purchaser will be protected against such
an interest holder's claiming a larger interest by the doctrine
of contractual estoppel, 0o for he is a party to the contract to sell
contained in the division order. However, the injured royalty
owner has recourse against the party unjustly enriched by the
overpayment.61
John J. Graham
ing with delay rentals, production royalty and shut-in payments, the net effect
of recent court of appeal and Supreme Court decisions is to extenuate the dis-
tinctions between these lease payments. E.g., Bailey v. Meadows, 130 So. 2d 501
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) and Pierce v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 140 So. 2d 19 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1962) allowed cancellation of mineral leases for failure to pay produc-
tion royalties without requiring default, which is precisely the result reached in
decisions cancelling leases for failure to pay delay rentals, though different
reasoning was relied on. Davis v. Laster, 242 La. 735, 138 So. 2d 558 (1962),
concerned with failure to pay shut-in gas payments, applied principles pronounced
in a decision as applicable to delay rentals. Furthermore as the courts fre-
quently consider royalty payments equivalent to rent, all three lease payments
may apparently be considered rental payments. E.g., Milling v. Collector of
Revenue, 200 La. 773, 57 So. 2d 679 (1952) ; Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 173
La. 313, 137 So. 46 (1931) ; Board of Commissioners of Caddo Levee District v.
Pure Oil Co., 167 La. 801, 120 So. 373 (1928) ; Logan v. State Gravel Co., 158
La. 105, 103 So. 526 (1925).
59. Fry v. Farm Bureau Oil Co., 3 Il1. 2d 94, 119 N.E. 2d 749 (1954) ; Kile
v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 118 Okla. 176, 247 Pac. 681 (1925); Ebberts v.
Carpenter Prod. Co., 256 S.W. 2d 601 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), 2 OIL & GAS REP.
726, 740 (1953).
60. Dale v. Case, 217 Miss. 298, 64 So. 2d 344 (1953) ; Chicago Corp. v.
Wall, 156 Tex. 217, 293 S.W. 2d 844 (1956).
61. Dale v. Case, 217 Miss. 298, 64 So. 2d 344 (1953) ; Hafeman v. Gem Oil
Co., 163 Neb. 438, 80 N.W. 2d 139 (1956) ; Chicago Corp. v. Wall, 156 Tex. 217,
293 S.W. 2d 844 (1956) ; Allen v. Creighton, 131 S.W. 2d 47 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939). See note 42 Rupra.
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